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ACADEMIC ESPIONAGE: STRIKING THE BALANCE BETWEEN 
OPEN AND COLLABORATIVE UNIVERSITIES AND PROTECTING 
NATIONAL SECURITY 
Erin N. Grubbs* 
American universities and research laboratories strive to foster 
open, collaborative spaces, where students from all over the world 
can come to learn from leading academics in their field of study. 
However, some people believe this open and collaborative 
environment is threatened by international students who are coming 
not to add to the environment, but rather to take from it. Academic 
espionage is not a new problem, but it is a problem that the Trump 
administration and Congress are working diligently to solve. 
Lawmakers, administrative agencies, and universities are striving 
to determine whether there are enough safeguards in place to 
protect the United States’ intellectual property. Alternatively, others 
are wondering whether the restrictions being put in place are truly 
necessary or if they are instead hindering the open exchange of 
ideas that is needed to advance science and research. This Recent 
Development argues that better awareness about academic 
espionage, not more safeguards, is required to protect the United 
States’ academic institutions. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
American universities are a staple of academic advancements in 
science and technology not only in the United States, but around the 
world. These universities produce talented American scholars, along 
with individuals who return to their home countries and lead top 
businesses and governmental affairs abroad.1 American universities 
thrive on fostering collaborative environments where ideas shared 
among peers and colleagues advance various fields, especially 
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. 
With this great power though, comes great responsibility.2 There 
is a growing concern these American universities, which pride 
                                                 
 1 Student Visa Integrity: Protecting Educational Opportunity and National 
Security: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Border Sec. and Immigration of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2018) [hereinafter Student Visa Integrity] 
(statement of Sen. Mazie Hirono, Member, Subcomm. on Border Sec. and 
Immigration). 
 2 SPIDERMAN (Columbia Pictures 2002). 
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themselves on their open-door policies and collaborative 
environments, are perhaps opening their doors too wide.3 American 
government officials and agencies fear information vital to national 
security and defense may walk out the door with foreign nationals, 
back to their home countries, ultimately to be used against the 
United States.4 In 2018, the Senate Subcommittee on Border 
Security and Immigration held a hearing titled “Student Visa 
Integrity: Protecting Educational Opportunities and National 
Security.”5 This hearing, along with other discussions at the federal 
level and with universities, considered whether enough safeguards 
are in place to protect American information from academic 
espionage.6 
This Recent Development discusses academic espionage 
broadly, and then considers the current legal structure in place to 
stop proprietary academic knowledge and research from leaving the 
United States when it should not. Part II defines academic espionage 
and lays out the landscape of international students that have 
attended or are attending American universities. Part III describes 
the current legal basis to protect academic knowledge at these 
universities. Part IV discusses three recent academic espionage 
cases. Part V explores recommendations and what else can be done 
to combat this issue. 
II.  THE GROWING CONCERN AROUND ACADEMIC ESPIONAGE 
Academic espionage is not a new phenomenon.7 The United 
States has long feared that its international adversaries may leverage 
the open environments of universities to siphon off technical 
information.8 Academic espionage specifically focuses on the 
                                                 
 3 Student Visa Integrity, supra note 1. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Hdeel Abdelhady, Trade Wars: Restricting Foreign Access to US Technology, 
LAW360 (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1093803/trade-wars-
restricting-foreign-access-to-us-technology. 
 8 See generally DANIEL GOLDEN, SPY SCHOOLS: HOW THE CIA, FBI, AND 
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SECRETLY EXPLOIT AMERICA’S UNIVERSITIES 39 (2017) 
(noting how the fear of universities being a prime location for espionage dates 
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gathering of intelligence information from a university setting.9 
From research labs to classrooms across the United States, foreign 
countries may look for “access to sensitive military and civilian 
research.”10  
With the number of international students in the United States 
exceeding one million for the third year in a row,11 the concerns 
around academic espionage remain germane. Central to 
understanding these concerns is how the term academic espionage 
is defined and the role it plays in the higher education system in the 
United States. 
A. Defining Academic Espionage 
Espionage is defined as “the practice of spying or using spies to 
obtain information about the plans and activities especially of a 
foreign government or a competing company.”12 Espionage is one 
of the world’s oldest professions, beginning with references “in the 
Bible, in ancient Greece, and in ancient China.”13 Although a known 
problem, few international treaties address espionage.14 The 
conundrum with espionage is that nations promote and acknowledge 
their own intelligence agencies for seeking out vital intel while 
denouncing foreign intelligence agencies for violating sovereignty.15 
                                                 
back to the Cold War, evidenced by the fact that “[o]f 400 Soviet exchange 
students who attended U.S. universities from 1965 to 1975, the FBI identified 
more than 100 as intelligence officers”). 
 9 Id. at xvii. 
 10 Id. at xvii-xviii. 
 11 Number of International Students in the United States Reaches New High of 
1.09 Million, INST. OF INT’L EDUC. (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.iie.org/Why-
IIE/Announcements/2018/11/2018-11-13-Number-of-International-Students-
Reaches-New-High. 
 12 Espionage, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/espionage (last visited Mar. 2, 2019). 
 13 Darien Pun, Comment, Rethinking Espionage in the Modern Era, 18 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 353, 355 (2017) (footnotes omitted). 
 14 Simon Chesterman, The Spy Who Came in From the Cold War: Intelligence 
and International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1071, 1072, n.4 (2006) (noting the 
only existing treaties related to intelligence are focused on intelligence-sharing 
between allies, such as United Kingdom-USA Intelligence Agreement). 
 15 Pun, supra note 13, at 355. 
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Academic espionage is specifically focused on data and 
information being taken from university settings and has long been 
on the radar of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and the 
Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”).16 As early as the 1960s–70s, 
the FBI and CIA monitored foreign students from Iran, China, and 
the Soviet Union, searching for possible informants and intelligence 
officers.17 Recent high-profile academic espionage incidents have 
government officials questioning if enough is being done to combat 
this intrusion. For example, “[in] March of 2019 the U.S. 
Department of Justice indicted nine Iranian individuals for allegedly 
hacking into the accounts of professors across 144 American 
universities and stealing more than $3.4 billion in intellectual 
property and research data.”18 
Academic freedom does not come without a cost.19 American 
taxpayers pay for academic research and development engaged in 
by the United States government.20 The cost is often considered 
worthwhile because of the social benefit of progressing 
knowledge.21 Most of this research, funded by American taxpayers, 
is considered fundamental and thus does not have restrictions on it; 
however, some of the research is off-limits to foreign students.22 In 
2014, the United States Department of Defense23 found that “nearly 
                                                 
 16 See Michaela Ross, Spy Theft of U.S University Research Sparks Call for 
Action, BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 11, 2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/tech-
and-telecom-law/spy-theft-of-us-university-research-sparks-call-for-action-1. 
See generally GOLDEN, supra note 8, at 33–40 (discussing FBI and CIA 
investigations of academic espionage). 
 17 See generally GOLDEN, supra note 8, at 33–40 (discussing FBI and CIA 
investigations of academic espionage). 
 18 Ross, supra note 16. 
 19 Joy Blanchard, A Struggle of Foreign Policy, State Power, and Academic 
Freedom: Faculty Senate of Florida International University v. Florida, 2014 
BYU EDUC. & L.J. 187, 189 (2014) (quoting Robert Post, The Structure of 
Academic Freedom, in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, at 73 
(Beshara Doumsani ed., Zone Books 2006)). 
 20 GOLDEN, supra note 8, at 7 (stating the United States government funds a 
great deal of academic research and development, spending $27.4 billion in 2014). 
 21 Blanchard, supra note 19, at 189. 
 22 Id. 
 23 All departments and agencies referenced in this Recent Development are 
United States agencies. 
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a quarter of all foreign efforts to obtain sensitive or classified 
information” was through academic institutions.24 This finding 
resulted in an increase in scrutiny when considering who should and 
should not be allowed to enter the United States to study.25 
B. International Students in Higher Education in the United 
States 
The 2017–2018 academic year was the third year in a row that 
international student enrollment in American universities surpassed 
one million.26 International students comprised 5.5 percent of the 
total student population at American universities in the 2017–2018 
academic year.27 Approximately 35 percent of those students 
enrolled were in graduate programs.28 Roughly one-third of the 
international students studying in the United States were from 
China.29 
Depending on the field of study, some programs are more 
heavily populated with international students than others.30 Overall, 
approximately 45 percent of international students in 2017–2018 
studied engineering, math, computer science, or physical and life 
sciences.31 In 2015, approximately 81 percent of electrical 
engineering graduate students and 79 percent of computer science 
graduate students were international students.32 In 2016, 
                                                 
 24 Ana Swanson & Keith Bradsher, White House Considers Restricting Chinese 
Researchers Over Espionage Fears, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/30/us/politics/trump-china-researchers-
espionage.html. 
 25 See generally id. (discussing the potential restrictions on Chinese nationals 
being admitted to the United States to perform research at American universities). 
 26 Enrollment, INST. OF INT’L EDUC. (2018), https://www.iie.org/Research-and-
Insights/Open-Doors/Data/International-Students/Enrollment. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. (noting 382,953 international students enrolled in a graduate program in 
the 2017–2018 academic year). 
 29 Id. (stating that 363,341 Chinese students were enrolled in American 
universities in 2017–2018). 
 30 See id. 
 31 Id. (noting 21.3 percent studied engineering, 17 percent studied math and 
computer science, and 7.2 percent studied physical and life sciences). 
 32 Stuart Anderson, Guess Who’s Not Coming to America? International 
Students, FORBES (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/ 
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approximately 39 percent of the graduate students studying science 
and engineering at American universities were temporary visa 
holders.33 
Despite the previous prominence of foreign citizens in graduate 
programs, the numbers of international graduate students began 
dropping in recent years.34 United States graduate enrollment saw a 
3.7 percent decline in international students between 2016 to 2017.35 
This decline is projected to double in the coming year.36 There was 
a 1.1 percent increase in first-time graduate enrollment of United 
States citizens and permanent residents, emphasizing the fact that 
only international students, not overall graduate enrollment, 
dropped.37 An even steeper decline is seen when looking at specific 
programs.38 For example, American physics PhD programs saw a 12 
percent decrease in applicants from 2017 to 2018.39 
Universities provide various reasons for this drop in 
international student enrollment. Some universities believe changes 
                                                 
2018/03/02/guess-whos-not-coming-to-america-international-
students/#55113ed23c3e. 
 33 NAT’L SCI. FOUND., NAT’L CTR. SCI. & ENGINEERING STATS., Table 13. 
Graduate Students in Science, Engineering, and Health in All Institutions, by 
Field, Citizenship, Ethnicity, and Race: 2011–16, in SURVEY OF GRADUATE 
STUDENTS AND POSTDOCTORATES IN SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING FALL 2016 
(2018), 
https://ncsesdata.nsf.gov/gradpostdoc/2016/html/GSS2016_DST_13.html. 
 34 See generally Kerrie Kennedy, US: International Graduate Students Drop 
4%, Trump a Potential Factor, THE PIE NEWS (Oct. 4, 2018), 
https://thepienews.com/news/us-international-graduate-student-enrolments-
down-4-trumps-policies-a-potential-factor/ (stating the enrollment of 
international graduate students at American universities went from a 0.9 percent 
decrease in the 2015–2016 academic year to 3.7 percent in the 2016–2017 
academic year). 
 35 Id. 
 36 Student Visa Integrity, supra note 1 (statement by Sen. Dick Durbin, Ranking 
Member, Subcomm. on Border Sec. and Immigration). 
 37 Id. 
 38 See generally Alexis Wolfe, US Physics PhD Programs See Drop in 
International Applications, PHYSICS TODAY (June 8, 2018), 
https://physicstoday.scitation.org/do/10.1063/PT.6.2.20180608a/full/ (clarifying 
a decrease in international applications does not necessarily mean a decrease in 
international student enrollments). 
 39 Id. 
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to immigration policy caused international visitors to stop applying 
for graduate programs.40 Others believe the drop may be attributable 
to international students being more deliberate in how they pursue 
their graduate education and seeking universities outside of the 
United States.41 Specifically, in the science, technology, 
engineering, and mathematics fields, an increase in global 
competition may be contributing to the decline in international 
graduate students.42 
Part of the concern with decreasing international student 
enrollment is the financial aspect.43 International students studying 
in American higher education institutions contribute an estimated 
$37 billion to the United States economy annually.44 In 2017, 
Chinese students alone “contributed $11 billion to the U.S. 
economy, while Indian students contributed another $5 billion.”45 
Thus, a drop in international students can have large financial 
impacts at universities. 
III.  CURRENT AND PROPOSED REQUIREMENTS FOR FOREIGN 
CITIZENS STUDYING IN THE UNITED STATES 
Safeguards to ensure that academic research and data are not 
subject to academic espionage are paramount. As such, the United 
States has several layered safeguards to protect its information. The 
first safeguard in place is the requirement that foreign citizens obtain 
a student visa to study at an American university. After an 
international citizen obtains a student visa, export control 
regulations provide a second safeguard to protect research and data 
                                                 
 40 JULIE BAER, FALL 2017 INTERNATIONAL STUDENT ENROLLMENT HOT TOPICS 
SURVEY 1, 4–5 (2017) (finding that of the 552 institutions that responded to the 
survey, 68.4 percent cited visa application process or visa delays/denials as a 
major factor contributing to new international student declines). 
 41 Kennedy, supra note 34. 
 42 Wolfe, supra note 38 (citing to PhD programs in China and Japan increasing 
in quality, although not providing specific statistics in enrollment). 
 43 See Student Visa Integrity, supra note 1 (statement by Sen. Dick Durbin, 
Ranking Member, Subcomm. on Border Sec. and Immigration). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Aria Bendix, A Pause in International Students?, ATLANTIC (Mar. 13, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/03/a-pause-in-
international-students/519435/. 
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from leaving the United States. Executive orders, legislation, and 
administrative agency guidance are also used as additional 
safeguards in stopping academic espionage. 
A. The Process for Foreign Citizens to Gain a Student Visa 
When citizens of foreign countries choose to come to the United 
States to study, they must obtain a student visa. 46 There are two 
nonimmigrant visa categories that foreign citizens can apply to in 
order to study full-time in the United States.47 A Category F visa is 
required for “an alien having a residence in a foreign country which 
he has no intention of abandoning, who is a bona fide student 
qualified to pursue a full course of study” to enter the United States 
to study at a college or university.48 A Category M visa is required 
for those students who want to study at a “vocational or other 
recognized nonacademic institution, other than a language training 
program.”49 
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) runs the 
Student and Exchange Visitor Program (“SEVP”).50 “SEVP 
provides approval and oversight to schools authorized to enroll F 
and M nonimmigrant students and gives guidance to both schools 
and students about the requirements for maintaining [the student’s] 
status.”51 When a foreign citizen is applying for an F or M visa, the 
person must first apply and be accepted to a SEVP-approved 
                                                 
 46 There are over twenty types of nonimmigrant visas for those traveling 
temporarily to the United States. See About Visas – The Basics, U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE: BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFF., https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-
visas/visa-information-resources/frequently-asked-questions/about-basics.html 
(last visited Apr. 4, 2019). There are additional visas for people coming to live 
permanently in the United States. Id. The required visa depends on the purpose of 
the travel. Id. 
 47 Students and Employment, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVICES., 
https://www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/students-and-exchange-
visitors/students-and-employment (last updated Aug. 9, 2018). 
 48 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(i) (2018). 
 49 Id. § 1101(a)(15)(M)(i). 
 50 Student and Exchange Visitor Program, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/sevis (last updated Nov. 14, 2018). 
 51 Id. 
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school.52 SEVP-approved schools include colleges, universities, and 
vocational schools.53 
DHS also administers the Student and Exchange Visitor 
Information System (“SEVIS”), which is a web-based system 
designed to maintain “information on international nonimmigrant 
students and exchange visitors in the United States.”54 SEVIS 
provides for proper reporting and recordkeeping regarding 
nonimmigrant and exchange visitors and offers a way to track visa 
violators for which enforcement action should be taken.55 
International citizens coming to study in the United States remain 
within the SEVIS database throughout their time studying in the 
United States.56 
As part of the visa application, a vetting process occurs when 
foreign citizens apply to study in the United States. The applicant 
begins by completing an online nonimmigrant visa application form, 
scheduling an interview, and paying a processing fee.57 The 
application and screening system occur at the consular office and 
include “personal interviews, which employ analytic interview 
techniques, multiple biographic and biometric checks, and 
interagency review.”58 The biographic and biometric checks include 
fingerprints and full-face photographs, which are then cross-
referenced against multiple databases maintained by the U.S. 
government.59 A visa will not be issued unless “all relevant concerns 
                                                 
 52 ASS’N OF AM. UNIVS., UNIVERSITY VISA SCREENING PROCEDURES 
OVERVIEW 1 (2018), https://www.aau.edu/sites/default/files/AAU-Files/Key-
Issues/Immigration/University-Visa-Screening-Procedures-Overview.pdf. 
 53 See generally U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, SEVP 
CERTIFIED SCHOOLS: UPDATED SEPTEMBER 19, 2018 (2018), 
https://studyinthestates.dhs.gov/assets/certified-school-list-09-19-18.pdf (listing 
all of the SEVP certified schools). 
 54 Student and Exchange Visitor Program, supra note 50. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Student Visa Integrity, supra note 1 (statement of Edward Ramotowski, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa Services, United States Department of State). 
 57 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-608, NONIMMIGRANT VISAS 
OUTCOMES OF APPLICATIONS AND CHANGES IN RESPONSE TO 2017 EXECUTIVE 
ACTIONS 11 (Aug. 2018). 
 58 Student Visa Integrity, supra note 1 (statement of Edward Ramotowski, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa Services, United States Department of State). 
 59 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 57, at 15. 
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raised during this process are fully resolved.”60 Criminal convictions 
or “reasonable suspicion” of criminal behavior may be cause for visa 
denial.61 Even after passing the consular office review, the visa only 
admits the student to travel to a port of entry.62 Once at the port of 
entry additional permission is needed from a Customs and Border 
Protection Officer.63 
In general, student and exchange visitor visa issuances 
decreased each year from fiscal years 2015 through 2017.64 In 2017, 
814,138 student and exchange visitor visas were issued, which was 
down from 1,064,176 in 2015.65 In the same year, the United States 
government refused 18 percent of student and exchange visa 
applicants.66 The majority of refusals were related to the applicants 
not being able to overcome the presumption of an intent to 
immigrate or the applicant not meeting the visa eligibility criteria.67 
B. Export Control Regulations 
In addition to student visas, another protective function the 
United States has in place is export control regulations “to protect 
the national security and foreign policy interests” of the country.68 
Export control regulations focus on regulating the “transfer of 
specific or general types of technology to foreign persons.”69 The 
Departments of Commerce, Treasury, and State each have 
                                                 
 60 Student Visa Integrity, supra note 1 (statement of Edward Ramotowski, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa Services, United States Department of State). 
 61 ASS’N OF AM. UNIVS., supra note 52. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 57, at 57. 
 65 Id. (reporting 420,992 F type visas issued, 383,165 J-type visas issued, and 
9,981 M-type visas issued in 2017). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Overview: Federal Agencies and their Export Control Regulations, STAN. U. 
(Feb. 1, 2019) [hereinafter Overview], https://doresearch.stanford.edu/research-
scholarship/export-controls/overview#federal-agencies-and-their-export-control-
regulations. 
 69 Modernizing Export Controls: Protecting Cutting-Edge Technology and U.S. 
National Security Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 115th Cong. (2018) 
[hereinafter Modernizing Export Controls] (testimony of Mario Mancuso, Senior 
Visiting Fellow for Int’l Sec., The Hudson Inst., Partner, Kirkland & Ellis). 
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regulations pertaining to export controls.70 Export control 
regulations cover everything from commodities to information 
technology to software to services.71 
The Bureau of Industry and Security72 issued Export 
Administration Regulations (“EAR”) pertaining to “dual-use” 
items, meaning those items that have civil and military 
applications.73 The EAR implements the Export Administration Act 
of 1979.74 The EAR defines items and activities subject to the 
regulation as activities “related to the proliferation of nuclear 
explosive devices, chemical or biological weapons, [or] missile 
technology.”75 Additionally, the EAR contains a Commerce Control 
List, describing items, commodities, software, and technology 
subject to the authority of the Bureau of Industry and Security.76 If 
an item or activity is subject to the EAR, various prohibitions may 
apply.77 In addition, a license may be required for an item or activity 
depending on the country where the item is going, the end-use, or 
end-user.78 
Items not considered dual-use may still be subject to the Office 
of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”)79 economic and trade 
sanctions, which focus on United States foreign policy and national 
security interests.80 The Foreign Assets Control Regulations pertain 
                                                 
 70 Overview, supra note 68. 
 71 Modernizing Export Controls, supra note 69 (prepared remarks of Kevin J. 
Wolf, Partner, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld). 
 72 This bureau is within the United States Department of Commerce. 
 73 Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 730.1–.10 (2018). 
 74 Id. § 730.2 (citing the Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. 
2401–2420). However, the Export Administration Act of 1979 was repealed in 
2018 by the Export Control Reform Act of 2018. The Export Control Reform Act 
of 2018 also requires the Secretary of Commerce to establish controls under the 
Export Administration Regulation. John S. McCain National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, H.R. 5515, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 75 15 C.F.R. § 734. 
 76 Id. § 734.1. 
 77 Id. § 736. 
 78 Id. §§ 738, 744. 
 79 This office is within the United States Department of Treasury. 
 80 About: Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, 
https://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Office-
of-Foreign-Assets-Control.aspx (last updated Apr. 5, 2019) 
MAY 2019] Academic Espionage 247 
to transactions, meaning payment or transfer, export or withdrawal, 
or transfer of credit.81 OFAC maintains lists of sanctions focused on 
specifically designated nationals and countries.82 
Lastly, the Department of State issued the International Traffic 
in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”).83 The ITAR implements the Arms 
Export Control Act, which covers “the export and temporary import 
of defense articles and services.”84 The ITAR defines defense 
articles with an extensive list of United States Munitions ranging 
from nonautomatic and semiautomatic firearms to “any explosive, 
propellant, pyrotechnic, fuel, oxidizer, binder, additive, or 
precursor” that “is being developed using classified information.”85 
Defense services are defined as assisting foreign persons in 
developing defense articles.86 The ITAR requires registration of 
persons who deal with defense articles or furnish defense services.87 
Additionally, the Department of State issues licenses for the export 
or temporary import of defense articles.88 
C. Exclusions from Export Regulations 
Dating as far back as 1981, concerns about the balance of 
national security and collaborative university environments arose.89 
In 1981, five presidents from prominent American research 
universities raised their concerns about proposed export controls to 
the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Commerce.90 This prompted 
                                                 
 81 Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 500.308 (2018). 
 82 Consolidated Sanctions List Data Files, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY (Mar. 14, 
2019), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/SDN-
List/Pages/consolidated.aspx. 
 83 International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. § 120–30 (2018). 
 84 Id. § 120.2 (citing the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2751). 
 85 Id. § 121.1 Category V (h) (2018). 
 86 Id. § 120.9(a)(1). The full definition of defense services includes assisting in 
“design, development, engineering, manufacture, production, assembly, 
assembling, testing, repair, maintenance, modification, operation, 
demilitarization, destruction, processing or use of defense articles.” Id. 
 87 See id. § 122.1(a). 
 88 See id. § 123.1(a). 
 89 NEAL LANE, Tighter Controls to Prevent Espionage at U.S. Research 
Laboratories Are Harmful, in ESPIONAGE AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING 106–
07 (Louise I. Gerdes ed., 2004). 
 90 Id. 
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President Reagan to issue National Security Decision Directive 189 
in 1985.91 The directive defined fundamental research and the 
Administration’s desire to keep fundamental research unrestricted.92 
Today, in an academic setting, such as a research lab or 
university, there are three key types of information that fall outside 
of export control regulations: fundamental research, educational 
information, and published information exclusions.93 Fundamental 
research is comprised of basic science and engineering results that 
would ordinarily be “published and shared broadly within the 
scientific community . . . .”94 Fundamental research is distinct from 
non-fundamental research, which may be “restricted for proprietary 
or national security reasons.”95 Educational information is 
comprised of information taught at a university or an associated 
teaching laboratory during normal instruction.96 Published 
information consists of already published or public domain 
information.97 If the information can be categorized as fundamental 
research, educational information, or published information, it is not 
subject to export control regulations.98 
Oftentimes, the confusion around what constitutes fundamental 
research can get universities in trouble.99 Most university activities 
                                                 
 91 Id. 
 92 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NSDD-189, NATIONAL POLICY ON THE 
TRANSFER OF SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL AND ENGINEERING INFORMATION 1 (1985) 
[hereinafter NSDD-189], https://research.archives.gov/id/6879779 (defining 
fundamental research as “basic and applied research in science and engineering, 
the results of which ordinarily are published and shared broadly within the 
scientific community, as distinguished from proprietary research and from 
industrial development, design, production, and product utilization, the results of 
which ordinarily are restricted for proprietary or national security reasons”). 
 93 Policies and Procedures, OHIO ST. U. OFF. OF RES. & COMPLIANCE, 
http://orc.osu.edu/regulations-policies/exportcontrol/policies-and-procedures/ 
(last visited Apr. 4, 2019). 
 94 NSDD-189, supra note 92. 
 95 Id. 
 96 FAQs, OHIO ST. U. OFF. OF RES. & COMPLIANCE, http://orc.osu.edu/ 
regulations-policies/exportcontrol/faqs/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2019). 
 97 Id. 
 98 See 15 C.F.R. § 734.8 (2018). 
 99 See generally William Metcalf, Do Higher Education Institutions Have a 
Misunderstanding of the Fundamental Research Exemption: How Export Control 
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falls into the category of fundamental research and are thus exempt 
from export controls.100 However, research is not fundamental if the 
university accepts certain publication restrictions,101 is funded by the 
government and there are protections on the information,102 or the 
research is funded by a corporate sponsor and there is a 
prepublication review requirement.103 
Additionally, confusion around “deemed exports is a major risk 
for universities.”104 A “deemed export” is when there is a release or 
transfer of “technology”105 to a foreign person.106 Therefore, even 
having a foreign national work on certain projects and see 
information can be considered a deemed export.107 Many American 
universities clarify within policy documents the export control 
requirements and how they apply to the university to protect against 
potential violations.108 
D. Executive Orders to Combat Academic Espionage 
A recent addition to the protective measures against academic 
espionage occurred in December 2017 when President Trump 
                                                 
Regulations Change University Research, 39 J.L. & EDUC. 281, 286 (2010) 
(discussing how most university activity constitutes fundamental research, but 
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activity outside of the exemption”). 
 100 Id. 
 101 See id. (citing the EAR requirements, 15 C.F.R. § 734.8). 
 102 See id. (citing the ITAR requirements, 22 C.F.R. § 120.11(a)). 
 103 See id. (citing the EAR requirements, 15 C.F.R. § 734.8). 
 104 See id. at 284. 
 105 The EAR defines technology as “information necessary for the 
‘development,’ ‘production,’ ‘use,’ operation, installation, maintenance, repair, 
overhaul, or refurbishing . . . of an item.” 15 C.F.R. § 772.1 (2018). 
 106 Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 734.13(a)(2) (2018). 
 107 Metcalf, supra note 99, at 284. 
 108 See, e.g., Export Controls, STAN. U. https://doresearch.stanford.edu/ 
research-scholarship/export-controls (last visited Apr. 4, 2019); Export Control, 
OHIO ST. U. OFF. OF RES. & COMPLIANCE, http://orc.osu.edu/regulations-
policies/exportcontrol/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2019); Export Control, BOS. 
U., http://www.bu.edu/researchsupport/compliance/export-control/ (last visited 
Apr. 4, 2019); Export Controls, U. OF MICH., https://research-
compliance.umich.edu/export-controls (last visited Apr. 4, 2019). 
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announced his National Security Strategy.109 President Trump 
highlighted a need to “tighten visa procedures” in the “Promote and 
Protect the U.S. National Security Innovation Base” section of his 
National Security Strategy.110 That section states the administration 
will “consider restrictions on foreign [science, technology, 
engineering, and mathematics] students from designated countries 
to ensure that intellectual property is not transferred to our 
competitors, while acknowledging the importance of recruiting the 
most advanced technical workforce to the United States.”111 
Universities are mentioned within the “Protect Data and Underlying 
Infrastructure” subheading of the National Security Strategy and are 
encouraged to “defeat espionage and theft.”112 
President Trump is not the first president to propose these types 
of restrictions on foreign students. In 1949, while discussing the 
Atomic Energy Commission, the Senate heard arguments about 
restricting the exportation of radioisotopes and considering whether 
or not this type of export was basic research.113 In 1952, arguments 
were raised against “McCarthy-era restrictions on visas for foreign 
nationals.”114 During the Cold War, export control regulations came 
back onto the radar of United States government officials.115 The 
goal with export controls during the Cold War was to “buy time, 
preserve the U.S. lead, and keep adversaries from exploiting the 
latest technological developments.”116 President Reagan issued the 
                                                 
 109 WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA (2017). 
 110 Id. at 22. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id.; see also Andy J. Semotiuk, Foreign Students to Deal with Uncertainties 
Under New U.S. Immigration Policy, FORBES (June 13, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/andyjsemotiuk/2018/06/13/raising-the-bar-on-
international-students-new-uscis-policy-looks-to-target-college-
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 113 John Krige, National Security and Academia: Regulating the International 
Circulation of Knowledge, BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Mar.–Apr. 2014, at 
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 114 Id. at 43–44. 
 115 See LANE, supra note 89, at 107. 
 116 Id. 
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National Security Decision Directive during the Cold War era 
focusing on the definition of fundamental research.117 
Following the 2001 terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush 
also enforced strict visa policies on graduate students.118 In addition 
to visa policy controls, the United States turned a greater focus to 
export controls after the September 11 attacks.119 The Commission 
Report following the September 11 terrorist attacks found that “the 
9/11 terrorists and their supporters relied on access to U.S.-origin 
technologies and financial networks to achieve their scheme.”120 
Following the attacks, the enforcement of export controls became a 
focus of the Department of Justice.121 
The Obama administration also proposed a rule that would limit 
the resources available to United States’ colleges working on 
company-sponsored research pertaining to munitions, nuclear 
engineering, and satellite technologies.122 When the Obama 
administration proposed that rule, there were no open cases of 
industrial espionage involving university research.123 Yet, 
counterterrorism and counter nuclear proliferation experts believed 
universities were “soft targets” for espionage.124 
At the same time, President Obama focused on updating the 
export control system and taking a hard look at “what we control, 
                                                 
 117 Krige, supra note 113, at 44. 
 118 See Jeffrey Mervis, More Restrictive U.S. Policy on Chinese Graduate 
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how we control it, how we enforce those controls, and how we 
manage our controls.”125 President Obama’s goal was that beginning 
in 2010, and for the next five years, exports would double in order 
to support American jobs.126 Although not all of President Obama’s 
goals were accomplished, his administration was successful in 
harmonizing some licensing policies and consolidating screening 
lists from various agencies.127 
E. Legislative Attempts to Combat Academic Espionage 
Along with actions being taken by the executive branch, the 
legislative branch in recent years advanced potential safeguards to 
academic espionage concerns. In May 2018, Senator Ted Cruz 
proposed the Stop Higher Education Espionage and Threat Act of 
2018.128 The bill was designed to amend Chapter 33 of Title 28 of 
the United States Code by adding an additional section related 
specifically to “designation of foreign intelligence threats to higher 
education.”129 The bill did not name any specific countries; however, 
Senator Cruz was quoted in the Washington Post as saying, 
“Communist China is infiltrating American universities to meddle 
with our curricula, silence criticism of their regime, and steal 
intellectual property including sensitive dual-use research.”130 
Senator Cruz’s bill develops a method for the FBI to designate a 
person as a “foreign intelligence threat to higher education” 
                                                 
 125 PRESIDENT OBAMA ANNOUNCES FIRST STEPS TOWARD IMPLEMENTATION 
OF NEW U.S. EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM, THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE 
PRESS SEC’Y (Dec. 9, 2010), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
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implementation-new-us-expor. 
 126 See id. 
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 128 Stop Higher Education Espionage and Theft Act of 2018, S. 2903, 115th 
Cong. (2018). 
 129 Id. § 2. 
 130 Josh Rogin, Preventing Chinese Espionage at America’s Universities, 
WASH. POST (May 22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/josh-
rogin/wp/2018/05/22/preventing-chinese-espionage-at-americas-
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focusing on foreign actors that commit, attempt to commit, or 
conspire to commit espionage, kidnapping, or fraud.131 The proposed 
bill also describes disclosures required for foreign gifts or contracts 
to institutions of higher education.132 As of the writing of this article, 
the bill has not moved beyond the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary.133 
In August 2018, President Trump signed the John S. McCain 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which 
contained the Export Control Reform Act (“ECRA”) of 2018.134 The 
ECRA repealed the Export Administration Act of 1979, which 
previously provided the statutory authority for the Export 
Administration Regulations.135 The need for the ECRA stemmed 
from the changes that occurred over the last 40 years since the 1979 
Act was passed and from a push for permanent authority.136 The 
ECRA establishes numerous new requirements, such as: (1) an 
interagency process focusing on “emerging and foundational 
technologies” and their export, (2) requiring license requirements 
reviews for certain countries, and (3) requiring export licensing by 
the Commerce Department to consider “impacts on the [United 
                                                 
 131 S. 2903, 115th Cong. § 540D(b)(1) (2018). 
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 133 S.2903 – Stop Higher Education Espionage and Theft Act of 2018, 
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/2903/ 
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 136 Modernizing Export Controls, supra note 69 (testimony of Kevin J. Wolf, 
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States] ‘defense industrial base.’”137 The main impact of this 
regulatory change will be on new types of technologies considered 
critical to national security, in particular “cybersecurity, artificial 
intelligence, and machine learning,” which previously did not have 
as strong of an emphasis under the regulations.138 
F. Guidance from Administrative Agencies Regarding 
Academic Espionage 
DHS proposed revisions to visa policies in May 2018.139 The 
revisions pertained to F visas (student visas), J visas (exchange 
visitors), and M visas (vocational students) focusing on when the 
visa holders would be considered unlawfully present.140 Unlawful 
presence relates to the time when a person is within the United States 
when they are not permitted to be or are paroled.141 The Accrual of 
Unlawful Presence and F, J, and M Nonimmigrants Policy 
Memorandum (“Policy Memorandum”) stated that on or after 
August 9, 2018, individuals on F, J, or M nonimmigrant visas will 
be considered unlawfully present in the United States when any of 
the following conditions occur: (1) the day after the nonimmigrant 
is no longer pursuing the course of study or authorized activity they 
were admitted into the country for; (2) the day following the 
completion of the nonimmigrant’s course of study or program; (3) 
the day following the expiration of the nonimmigrant’s form I-94; 
or (4) the day after an immigration judge orders the nonimmigrant 
be excluded, deported, or removed.142 The goal of the change in 
                                                 
 137 John P. Barker et al., New Law Expands and Reforms CFIUS Jurisdiction 
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unlawful presence was to lessen the number of visa overstays and 
improve implementation of the unlawful presence criteria.143 
On October 23, 2018, Guilford College144 filed a lawsuit in the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of North 
Carolina challenging the Policy Memorandum.145 The complaint 
alleged four causes of action: (1) the Policy Memorandum does not 
follow the procedures required by the Administrative Procedure 
Act, (2) the Policy Memorandum is arbitrary and capricious, (3) the 
Policy Memorandum is inconsistent with the statutory text of the 
code pertaining to aliens and nationality (8 U.S.C. § 1182), and (4) 
the Policy Memorandum violates the due process guarantee of the 
Fifth Amendment.146 The government filed a motion to dismiss the 
case in January 2019.147 As of the writing of this article, the case is 
still ongoing. Until the court reaches a decision, the Policy 
Memorandum remains in full effect.148 
Along with DHS, the Department of State issued guidance in 
June 2018 regarding F-1 visas for citizens of China.149 The guidance 
changed the validity of visa eligibility from five years to one year 
for Chinese citizens studying in certain fields such as robotics, 
aviation, and manufacturing.150 The concept is likened to needing a 
ticket stub to re-enter an event.151 It is not that Chinese students 
cannot leave, then re-enter the United States, but their visa, or ticket 
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in this analogy, is only valid for one year instead of five.152 This 
raises concerns regarding the ability of Chinese students to attend 
international conferences or even to go home to visit their families, 
thus possibly putting the Chinese students at a competitive 
disadvantage compared to other non-Chinese students.153 
IV.  ACADEMIC ESPIONAGE CASES 
According to the Department of Defense, academic solicitation 
of students, professors, scientists or researchers for clandestine 
operations went from 8 percent in 2010 to 24 percent in 2014.154 The 
Department of Defense also found that “nearly a quarter of all 
foreign efforts to obtain sensitive or classified information” had 
been done through academic institutions.155 With these numbers on 
the rise, the FBI continues to pursue potential cases of academic 
espionage in university settings. Some of these pursuits prove 
fruitful, while others do not.156 Three key cases are relevant to this 
discussion: Ruopeng Liu, Dr. Xiaoxing Xi, and J. Reece Roth.157 
These cases demonstrate the range from unsuccessful academic 
espionage charges being brought to successful charges that resulted 
in a prison sentence. 
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A. Learning from Liu 
The case of Ruopeng Liu was opened by the FBI in 2010 based 
on allegations that Liu stole intellectual property while studying in 
the United States.158 Ruopeng Liu, a Chinese national, came to study 
under Dr. David Smith and work in his lab at Duke University.159 
Dr. Smith, a renowned professor of computer and electrical 
engineering at Duke University, became a target of what was 
believed to be academic espionage.160  
Dr. Smith focuses on the field of meta-materials, specifically 
creation of an invisibility cloak, or a cloak that can conceal objects 
from microwaves.161 While working in the lab, Liu engaged in 
“suspicious” behavior including inviting two Chinese colleagues to 
visit and work in Dr. Smith’s lab.162 Shortly after the visit, an exact 
replica of Dr. Smith’s measuring equipment was recreated in Liu’s 
old lab in China.163 Although a case was opened on Liu in 2010, the 
FBI later closed the case due to a lack of evidence.164 
B. What Went Wrong with Xi 
The case of Dr. Xiaoxing Xi demonstrates a time where the FBI 
was wrong in bringing charges of academic espionage.165 The 
Department of Justice charged Dr. Xiaoxing Xi, chairman of 
Temple University’s physics department, with “sharing sensitive 
American-made technology with China.”166 The FBI began 
investigating Dr. Xi as a potential spy, ultimately arresting him in 
May 2015.167 The FBI did not present evidence of espionage, but 
rather, the FBI alleged Dr. Xi shared detailed schematics of a pocket 
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heater with Chinese researchers.168 The pocket heater was important 
to superconductor research and thus subject to export control.169 The 
Department of Justice dropped the charges after leading scientists in 
the field gave sworn statements that the blueprints were not for a 
pocket heater, but rather for a device Dr. Xi invented and shared 
with Chinese researchers under normal academic collaboration.170 
As a result of the incorrect charges, Dr. Xi was placed on 
administrative leave and the university revoked his title of physics 
department chairman.171 
Two years later, Dr. Xi filed a lawsuit against the FBI and the 
lead FBI agent on his case.172 Dr. Xi, a naturalized United States 
citizen, alleged multiple constitutional claims including malicious 
prosecution and fabrication of evidence, equal protection and due 
process violation, and unlawful search and seizure of property and 
belongings.173 Additionally, Dr. Xi alleged multiple torts including 
malicious prosecution, invasion of privacy, intentional and 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligence.174 Dr. Xi 
brought the action under the United States Constitution and the 
Federal Tort Claims Act.175 
C. The Tale of Roth 
The case of J. Reece Roth is one of the most well-known cases 
of academic espionage that resulted in a conviction and ultimately a 
prison sentence.176 In 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit convicted J. Reece Roth, a retired electrical 
engineering professor at the University of Tennessee, of “one count 
of conspiracy, fifteen counts of exporting defense articles and 
services without a license, and one count of wire fraud.”177 Roth 
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worked on contracts related to unmanned surveillance vehicles use 
of plasma-based guidance systems.178 The work was done through a 
Knoxville technology company who had a contract with the United 
States Air Force.179  
A grand jury found that Roth took sensitive information to 
foreign countries, and shared sensitive information with Chinese 
and Iranian students.180 The court determined that because the 
ultimate objective of the research was to incorporate the technology 
into military drones, the information constituted defense articles and 
services pursuant to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations.181 
Roth was ultimately “sentenced to four years in prison and two years 
probation.”182 
V.  ARE THE CURRENT METHODS TO COMBAT ACADEMIC 
ESPIONAGE ENOUGH? 
The threat of academic espionage is discussed among various 
federal agencies, including the FBI, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, and the Department of State.183 The goal is to ensure a 
proper amount of protections are in place without being overly 
burdensome on a university’s ability to further research and 
academic progress. 
In the instance of academic espionage, it is difficult to develop 
legal oversight that is sufficient, but not too restrictive. Some 
advocates believe the current programs are overly burdensome on 
institutions and restrict academic innovation.184 Others believe not 
enough is being done to protect research pertaining to national 
security risks.185 Neither position provides the best approach to the 
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nation’s problem. Instead, as there are enough regulations currently 
in place, the United States should focus on heightening awareness 
around existing regulations. 
A. Are Current Protections Too Much? 
In developing programs to combat academic espionage, it is 
crucial to ensure there is no discrimination based on nationality.186 
“To target a whole group of people as being subject to greater 
suspicion, based purely on race and national origin, and in advance 
of any facts or evidence, goes against the fundamental American 
ideals of the presumption of innocence, due process, and equal 
protection for all.”187 This could lead to violations of the Equal 
Protection clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
For example, the Department of State’s June 2018 guidance 
document specifically focuses on Chinese citizens.188 This process 
of trying to screen out potential spies would not really be detectable 
by consulate officers vetting visa applications.189 Additionally, there 
is no evidence to show that changing from a five-year to a one-year 
visa would deter a potential foreign-spy.190  
Similar to the Department of State, the rhetoric used by Senator 
Cruz regarding the proposed Stop Higher Education Espionage and 
Theft Act of 2018 bill focused on concerns regarding Chinese 
students.191 The bill itself does not name any specific countries.192 It 
is imperative that the actions of a few do not tarnish an entire 
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nationality while at the same time balancing the interests of national 
security.193 
Overly burdensome restrictions on international students can 
also lead to a loss of money for the United States and a lack of global 
diversity at universities.194 The United States is in a global 
competition for talent.195 A decrease in international students at 
American universities results in difficult budget cuts as many 
universities rely on the often higher tuition rates that foreign 
students pay compared with in-state students.196 For example, in 
Texas, the 85,000 international students contributed an estimated 
$2.1 billion and over 27,000 jobs.197 Similarly, in Illinois, which has 
over 52,000 international students, those students contributed $1.8 
billion to the economy and over 24,000 jobs.198 The more hurdles the 
United States puts in place for foreign citizens to study in the United 
States, the more likely those foreign citizens are to pursue degrees 
in other countries.199 
B. Are Current Protections Not Enough? 
A major concern with the current regulations is the ability of 
students to transfer programs at a university from a non-sensitive to 
a sensitive program.200 Louis Rodi, Deputy Assistant Director of the 
National Security Investigations Division in DHS, noted this as a 
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major concern and loophole in the current process.201 This concern 
is particularly pertinent in larger universities focused on research. 
The current regulations do not have a mechanism to flag when 
students transfer from non-sensitive programs into sensitive 
programs.202 A possible solution would be the university itself 
putting in place mechanisms to flag such concerns or implementing 
a requirement for a visa holder to declare an intention to change 
programs. 
Recently, the government focused its efforts of protecting 
against academic espionage on China.203 Chinese national students 
began studying in the United States in 1978 and the number of 
Chinese students studying in the United States continues to grow 
each year.204 International students in the United States are made up 
of almost one-third Chinese nationals.205 Since 2000, at least 30 
people born or raised in China who attended American universities 
have been charged with espionage or theft of trade secrets.206 It is 
not yet clear if the June 2018 Department of State guidance focused 
on Chinese students will be enough to alleviate these concerns 
around academic espionage. The discussion around China 
continued, at a broader level than just academic espionage, during a 
Senate committee hearing entitled: “China’s Non-Traditional 
Espionage Against the United States: The Threat and Potential 
Policy Responses.”207 The goal of the hearing was to discuss ways 
to counter activities such as researchers violating government grants 
and cyberattacks on government and private information.208 
                                                 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. However, there is no data to show how often this type of situation occurs 
and whether the concern is more hypothetical than real. 
 203 Swanson & Bradsher, supra note 24. 
 204 GOLDEN, supra note 8, at 34. 
 205 Scholars or Spies, supra note 154 (remarks by Daniel Golden, author of Spy 
Schools). 
 206 Id. 
 207 China’s Non-Traditional Espionage Against the United States: The Threat 
and Potential Policy Responses Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th 
Cong. (2018). 
 208 Id. (remarks by Sen. Chuck Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary). 
MAY 2019] Academic Espionage 263 
C. Are Current Protections Just Right? 
In many cases, more robust regulations are not necessary to 
protect against academic espionage. Instead, universities should 
implement more robust policies and programs aimed at educating 
professors and students on export controls in order to prevent 
potential academic espionage. Many universities currently have 
detailed policies in place.209 These policies focus on applying the 
export controls to potential activities at the university.210 
For example, The Ohio State University’s (“Ohio State”) policy, 
although emphasizing all personnel should be familiar with the 
policy, states that individuals specifically working in engineering, 
physical and computer sciences, biological sciences, and medicine 
should be particularly familiar with the policies.211 Ohio State’s 
policy breaks down the procedure for export control into major 
categories including export classifications, shipping, and technical 
data security.212 Other universities can benefit from developing 
similar policies and training materials to ensure consistent education 
of export controls. Each university needs to consider the type of 
research they engage in to ensure its policy is the right scale for its 
specific needs. 
Additionally, universities can benefit from centralizing the 
oversight for classified programs, unclassified programs, and export 
controls to ensure efficient use of resources and management of 
information.213 The centralized department can be responsible for 
maintaining an export control program and developing a policy for 
the university.214 This department can also focus on educating 
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university researchers and performing audits as necessary.215 The 
benefits of having one centralized program is a focus on information 
and protecting assets.216 
In addition to centralizing oversight, physical separation of 
export control and non-export control research may be advantageous 
specifically at large research universities. For example, Georgia 
Institute of Technology (“Georgia Tech”) has a separate nonprofit, 
research institute called the Georgia Tech Research Institute 
(“GTRI”).217 Unlike Georgia Tech, GTRI focuses more in depth on 
certain core competencies, such as cybersecurity information, 
electromagnetics, and threat systems research and development.218 
The Georgia Tech Office of Research Integrity Assurance 
developed a specific training in order to better administer the 
required export control information to those at the GTRI.219 
Although the same federal regulations apply to everyone, providing 
this separate training can ensure those whose research may be most 
susceptible to export controls fully understands the regulations and 
their applicability. 
Similarly, Johns Hopkins University has a separate applied 
physics laboratory.220 The Johns Hopkins Applied Physics 
Laboratory (“APL”) is the largest university affiliated research 
center, and much like GTRI, the center is a nonprofit organization.221 
APL was founded in 1942 to find solutions to national security, 
scientific, and engineering challenges facing the United States.222 
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APL continues to provide United States government agencies 
expertise and support in issues of national priority and to develop 
technology.223 Oftentimes, these types of research institutes are 
physically separated from the main campus of a university, and have 
different security measures than a standard university would in order 
to ensure export control protection. Separating these types of 
facilities is one way to ensure compliance with federal export 
control regulations and protect against academic espionage; 
however, it is not warranted at all universities, it depends on the type 
of research the university performs. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The conversation around academic espionage and export 
controls continues to be discussed at various levels of the federal 
government. A key issue in academic espionage that remains 
unresolved is that of emerging technologies. The Export Control 
Reform Act expands technology applicable to export control 
regulations to include emerging and foundational technologies.224 
The issue with emerging technologies is the technology is in such 
early stages it is not clear what exactly it can be used for, and, thus, 
it is not clear which export control regulations, if any, apply. The 
ECRA provides for an interagency process to determine what these 
emerging and foundational technologies may be and how to 
implement controls.225 This will likely impact university research 
and may expand the scope of what may be subject to export controls. 
A precarious balance exists between remaining a global leader 
in academic research and technological advancements while 
ensuring intellectual property is not improperly obtained and taken 
outside of the country. Export control regulations remain the 
strongest safeguard against this academic espionage threat. 
Continued implementation, guidance, and policies at the federal and 
university level will be vital to ensuring open and collaborative 
environments at universities can continue to thrive, while protecting 
national security. 
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